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This paper explores Michel Foucault’s conception of the role of writing in what he calls 
the “arts of the self,” ancient Greek and Roman practices of self-transformation, understood as 
the modification of one’s thoughts and conduct in light of some particular ethical ideal. I proceed 
by first explicating Foucault’s 1983 text “Self Writing,” in which he analyses two such practices, 
the keeping of hupomnēmata, personal notebooks of quotations and reflections; and the writing 
of correspondence to others, in which one both offers advice and guidance and recounts the 
details of one’s daily life. I then move on to apply Foucault’s analyses to a text about which they 
are curiously silent: Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations.  
My broad goal is to offer a preliminary sketch of a Foucauldian genealogy of writing as 
an art of the self. I argue that, for Foucault, the role of writing in the arts of the self is primarily 
confessional, where “confession” is understood as a sub-category of the arts of the self whereby 
self-transformation is achieved through an enunciation that relates oneself to the truth. In the 
case of hupomnēmata and correspondence, this truth is that of a discourse which one gathers 
close at hand through the writing of hupomnēmata and enunciates through correspondence; in 
both cases, true discourse is “subjectivated,” i.e. becomes the truth of the individual who writes.  
The Meditations is crucial to a genealogy of these practices, because the text finds 
Marcus Aurelius engaged in both hupomnēmata and correspondence, and thereby shows them to 
be distinct but related aspects of the confessional process Foucault describes. I illustrate this 
through a close reading of select chapters that best evidence either practice. In the case of 
hupomnēmata, these are Marcus’ numerous direct citations of other texts; in the case of 
correspondence, these are chapters where Marcus directly addresses himself in regard to his 
particular life circumstances, i.e. establishes a correspondence of himself with himself.  
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 Michel Foucault’s 1983 text “Self Writing” is a brief but rich entry in his late-period 
work on ancient Greek and Roman practices that he captures together under various names; here 
they are referred to both as the “arts of oneself” and the “arts of living” (from the Greek tekhnē 
tou biou).1 These are, broadly speaking, practices of self-transformation, of modifying one’s 
thoughts and conduct in light of some particular ethical ideal.2 Two such practices are discussed 
in “Self-Writing”: the keeping of personal notebooks, or hupomnēmata, and the writing of 
correspondence to others. This is a key text, then, for understanding Foucault’s conception of the 
role of writing in the arts of the self. 
 Yet even in this text that role is only briefly sketched out, especially compared to 
Foucault’s treatment of the other kinds of practices that, together, comprise his genealogy of the 
arts of the self.3 My broad goal in this paper, then, is to extend this genealogy further in terms of 
the role of writing. Such a project must necessarily go beyond Foucault’s work in some sense, 
but I aim to do so in such a way that it follows more naturally from that work that not; I aim to 
push Foucault’s genealogy of the arts of the self in a direction in which it was already clearly 
headed, judging from the analyses in “Self Writing.”4 
 More specifically, this will consist of: (1) an explication of Foucault’s analyses of 
hupomnēmata and correspondence in “Self Writing,” with an eye toward establishing their 
context as among the group of practices Foucault captures together under the heading of 
“confession;” and (2) an application of these analyses to a text about which they are curiously 
silent: Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. It is my contention that the Meditations is crucial to such a 
genealogy because it evidences both practices, operating alongside one another in a single text. 
This is important because hupomnēmata and correspondence represent two distinct but related 
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aspects of the confessional process that Foucault calls “the subjectivation of true discourse”; 
hupomnēmata constitutes this discourse in relation to the individual who compiles it, while 
correspondence establishes the writer as the subject of that discourse through the enunciation, in 
this case the letter to another, that effects it. 
 I will proceed in three sections. In the first, I situate “Self Writing” in the context of 
Foucault’s work on the arts of the self and on confession. In the second and third, I read the 
discussions of hupomnēmata and correspondence, respectively, alongside the Meditations; the 
goal is to pick out select passages of Marcus’ text that, I will argue, function as the practices that 
Foucault describes. In the case of hupomnēmata, this is best seen in Marcus’ numerous direct 
citations of other texts; in the case of correspondence, this is best seen in passages where 
Marcus’ directly addresses himself in regard to his particular life circumstances, effectively 
establishing a correspondence of himself with himself. 
I. Foucault on Writing and Confession 
 By the time of “Self Writing,” Foucault had already written and lectured a good deal on 
various aspects of the Greek and Roman arts of the self, including the role of writing. In these 
contexts, writing is repeatedly linked to the conception of confession that Foucault had first 
treated in-depth in the first volume of the History of Sexuality, before the emergence of his 
interest in the arts of the self.5 Once this interest does emerge, confession is taken up again in 
terms of what Foucault takes to be its origins in those ancient Greek and Roman practices. My 
goal in this first section is to briefly outline this background, in order to situate “Self Writing” in 




 In a 1980 lecture at Dartmouth College, Foucault tells us that to confess is “to declare 
aloud and intelligibly the truth about oneself,” and this can stand as his most general definition.6  
It should be noted at the outset that the use of the word “confession” to capture all of the 
practices which fall under this definition is, perhaps, controversial. In French, the word Foucault 
generally uses in this context is aveu, which could be translated as “confession” or “avowal,” 
depending on context. Most translators of Foucault into English opt for the former, but it has 
been argued, for example by the translator of Foucault’s 1981 lecture course at the Catholic 
University of Louvain, that “avowal” is more appropriate, at least in the context of Foucault’s 
treatment of the ancients.7 In the Dartmouth lectures, which were delivered in English, Foucault 
himself consistently uses the word “confession,” and it is for this reason that I use the word here. 
However, we should keep in mind that, whatever word we use, it is just a word, which for 
Foucault refers to a particular technical conception that is not adequately captured by the 
colloquial or everyday sense of either “confession” or “avowal” – or, for that matter, of aveu, as 
Foucault himself emphasizes in the Louvain lectures.8 
 It should also be noted that, initially, in the famous formulation of the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality, confession is defined in much more specific terms.9 But even in this 
context, where Foucault’s interest is exclusively the relationship of confessional practices to 
sexuality, he is explicit that “confession” encompasses a more general category, which need 
entail neither a particular form nor content: 
The motivations and effects [confession] is expected to produce have varied, as have the 
forms it has taken: interrogations, consultations, autobiographical narratives, letters: they 




The list of examples makes clear that confession can be spoken or written. This is in keeping 
with Foucault’s conception of the discursive “statement” as having a function independent of the 
act that formulates it; the confession is a kind of statement in this sense.11 
In the context of the arts of the self, Foucault views the role of writing as primarily 
confessional. In his 1981-82 lecture course at the Collége de France, Foucault claims that, for the 
ancients, writing is one of several practices through which one effects what he calls the 
“subjectivation of true discourse.”12 This takes place in the context of a practice of gathering 
together, through reading or listening, helpful discourses that comprise the principles and codes 
of conduct in light of which one seeks to modify one’s behaviour. Such discourses, when 
accepted as true, effect the desired transformation insofar as one enunciates that truth, and 
thereby becomes “the subject who tells the truth and who is transfigured by this enunciation of 
the truth… precisely by the fact of telling the truth.”13 This act of becoming the subject of a true 
discourse is what is captured by the word “subjectivation” here, and writing is one possible form 
of enunciation which accomplishes it. And we can see that this practice is indeed confessional, in 
the sense of being an enunciation, or statement, which relates the one who formulates it to the 
truth.  
 To better understand this relationship between the enunciation of truth and the 
transformation of the individual who enunciates it, we can turn again to both the Dartmouth and 
Louvain lectures, where Foucault traces the development of ancient confessional practices and 
outlines their general form. In both sets of lectures, Foucault reads two texts by Seneca as 
representative examples of Greco-Roman confessional discourse. The first is from the treatise 
On Anger, and describes a ritual of self-examination that Seneca claims to practice daily. One 
thing to note at the outset is that Foucault characterizes this practice as “a kind of confession to 
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oneself,” which again emphasizes the generality of “confession” as a concept for Foucault.14 
Because while it is true that in the initial formulation of the History of Sexuality the possibility of 
a “confession to oneself” is not accounted for, and emphasis is placed on the other to whom one 
confesses and, indeed, who compels one to confess,15 I understand the later formulation as a shift 
in emphasis, rather than in the essential conception. Foucault is more concerned, in the earlier 
context, with confession as a technique of power, and thereby emphasizes its coercive role. 
Later, when he is less interested in the coercive function of confession than in its general 
function as a means of relating self to truth, it becomes clear that neither compulsion nor the 
presence of another are necessary components of this relation; and yet, there is a sense in which 
to speak of a self-relation is to implicate the self as self and as other. We will have cause to 
return to this point when it comes to how Meditations can be seen to function as correspondence 
despite being written for no designated reader but Marcus himself. 
 To return to Seneca, the ritual that he describes is quite straightforward: at the end of the 
day he reviews all he has said and done in light of principles and rules of conduct that he has 
already accepted as true, received through discourses with which he is already thoroughly 
familiar. He notes all instances where his conduct falls short of these principles, and reminds 
himself to avoid similar errors in future.16 And they are just that: errors. Moral errors, certainly, 
insofar as they represent failures of conduct, but not anything like what will later be connoted by 
a word like “sin.” This confession is not a matter of weighing the relative guilt inherent to 
different acts, but rather of identifying what amount to simple mistakes, “bad adjustments 
between aims and means.”17 Neither is it a matter of identifying faults or failings for which to 
punish oneself. This is, on one level, a simple exercise of memory; in recalling what one has 
done and relating it to the discourses that one has accepted as true, one recommits that truth to 
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memory and thereby “reactivates” it. But in this very act of re-memorization it is also an 
example of the “subjectivation of discourse” that Foucault speaks about in the Collége de France 
lectures; one relates oneself to a true discourse through confessing one’s actions, and thereby 
seeks to internalize that discourse and transform oneself in its light. 
 The second text that Foucault considers is from the dialogue On Tranquility of Mind, in 
which Seneca’s friend, Serenus, recounts to him that which has left him feeling ill at ease. It 
represents, therefore, a slightly different form of confession, which more closely resembles the 
practices that concern Foucault in the first volume of the History of Sexuality. But unlike these 
practices, which derive most directly from forms of Christian penitence, in which one confesses 
“profound desires” indicative of “a deep concupiscence that is always present but hidden,”18 
Serenus enumerates a series of more or less banal acts and behaviours: “that he uses the 
earthenware he inherited from his father, that he easily gets carried away when he makes public 
speeches, and so on and so on.”19 The point, ultimately, is not to excavate a buried nature but, as 
with Seneca’s self-examination, to take account of acts and behaviours in relation to a discourse 
that one accepts as true and that has transmitted the principles to which one is committed. The 
principle that is primarily at issue in this specific instance appears to be the traditional Stoic 
maxim that one should remain unattached to those things that are outside of one’s own power. 
And Seneca’s role, as the other to whom Serenus confesses, is not that of “diagnosing a secret 
malady,” but of verifying the extent to which Serenus has succeeded in removing himself from 
attachments and of pointing out the attachments that still adhere, the better to be wary of in the 
future.20 
 As in the self-examination, the goal of Serenus’ confession is the subjectivation of true 
discourse, which in this case is aided and overseen by Seneca rather than undertaken alone. 
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Again, what is at issue is establishing and maintaining a relationship to the truth in terms of one’s 
conduct. It is not that Seneca helps Serenus to retrieve something from deep within himself, 
which was otherwise obscure to him; the practice is concerned solely with acts and with truth, 
both of which are readily available not only to Serenus, but to anyone familiar with his actions 
and the discourse to which he brings himself in relation. In the Collége de France lectures, 
Foucault articulates this as the difference between the enunciation through which one makes 
oneself the subject of true discourse, as the ancients do, and of objectifying oneself through a 
discourse one enunciates as the truth of oneself.21 
 This, then, is the general form of confession as an art of the self: the subjectivation of true 
discourse through the enunciation of acts and behaviours that brings one in relation to that 
discourse. The practices of hupomnēmata and correspondence are specific forms of confession, 
and the treatment of these in “Self Writing” is prefigured, briefly, in the 1981-82 lecture course. 
Here, they are less sharply delineated than they will be in the later essay, and Foucault seems to 
consider them more like successive steps in a single practice: first, one writes the hupomnēmata 
as a means of “incorporating” true discourse; second, one enters into the relationship of 
correspondence, either as the confessor or the one to whom is confessed, on the basis of the true 
discourse, the hupomnēmata, which one now has readily at hand. 
 By the time of “Self Writing,” as we will see, Foucault has clearly come to consider 
hupomnēmata and correspondence as distinct practices. That being said, they remain closely 
linked, and Foucault echoes his earlier description of the two as successive stages in the 
subjectivation of discourse when he writes that hupomnēmata can form the “raw material” of 
correspondence.22 This will be important to keep in mind when we turn to Marcus Aurelius’ 
Meditations, where we will find both practices at work in a single text. 
12 
 
II. Hupomnēmata and the Meditations 
 With this section I turn to the text of “Self Writing” itself, and to Marcus Aurelius’ 
Meditations. I will first explicate Foucault’s account of hupomnēmata, then apply it to select 
chapters of the Meditations. My broad goal here, again, is to undertake the beginnings a 
Foucauldian genealogy of writing as a practice of the self, and as such my goal in reading the 
Meditations is to extend Foucault’s account with an example of written discourse that evidences 
the practices he describes. That is to say, my primary claim regarding hupomnēmata and the 
Meditations is not that it offers a theoretical elaboration of hupomnēmata as an art of the self, 
though we will see that it might, but rather that it itself is hupomnēmata. In the third section, I 
will proceed in an identical manner, with identical goals, in terms of Foucault’s account of 
correspondence.  
 To begin, then, with hupomnēmata, the word can be translated most literally as “notes” or 
“notebooks,” and at the most basic level connotes nothing more than this, capturing everything 
from public registers to personal notebooks. But the term is also used to refer specifically to a 
practice of keeping a kind of “book of life,” in which one writes quotations from books read or 
things heard, examples of actions one has seen, heard, or read about, and reflections or 
arguments that one has heard, read, or which have otherwise come to mind.23 Foucault stresses 
that these books should not be understood as simple memory aids, but as “a material and a 
framework for exercises to be carried out frequently: reading, rereading, meditating, conversing 
with oneself and with others.”24 The idea is to render what one collates “near at hand,” not 
simply in the sense of being readily called to memory, but also as being readily available in the 
sphere understood as most important in moral reflection of this period: namely, that of action.25 
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If we recall from Foucault’s account of confession that it is precisely in this sphere of 
ethical action that the self is constituted, we can begin to see how the writing of hupomnēmata 
constitutes a confession in this Foucauldian sense. What one gathers together is, Foucault writes, 
“a matter of constituting a logos bioēthikos for oneself… in short, the soul must make them not 
merely its own but its self.”26 Recall, as well, that for Foucault we are at this point in time far 
from Christian confession, in which the self is constituted through what is understood as the 
unearthing of something deeply hidden; here “the intent is not to pursue the unspeakable, nor to 
say the unsaid, but on the contrary to capture the already-said, to collect what one has managed 
to hear or read.”27  
This clearly recalls Foucault’s earlier characterization of confession as the subjectivation 
of true discourse. The starting point of this subjectivation, as we have seen, is to have this true 
discourse ready to hand, and the hupomnēmata is a means of accomplishing this through writing. 
Here Foucault describes that discourse as “the fragmentary logos,” which, though cobbled 
together from various sources, nonetheless establishes itself as “a timeless discourse accepted 
almost everywhere.” Foucault emphasizes the cultural context of the Imperial period in which 
the practice emerged: it is “a culture strongly stamped by traditionality, by the recognized value 
of the already-said, by the recurrence of discourse, by ‘citational’ practice under the seal of 
antiquity and authority.”28 In such a context, truth is less something that needs to be 
independently experienced or verified than something to which one can bring oneself in 
accordance simply by accepting the validity of the logos that presents it. 
The gathering together of true discourse as hupomnēmata is thus a means of making 
possible its subjectivation by the individual, and Foucault elaborates on three key points in this 
regard. The first is that the writing of hupomnēmata is predicated on reading, and reading widely, 
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and is in fact understood as a way of mitigating the dangers of constant and exhaustive reading. 
Seneca, for example, articulates this danger as a kind of “scattering” effect, which results in 
stultitia, a kind of weakness of character born of excessive mental agitation and a preoccupation 
with the future.29 The hupomnēmata, through which one gathers in one place precisely those 
parts of one’s reading with those qualities, is a means of bringing some measure of order both to 
the material and to one’s thoughts about it, and thereby countering stultitia. And if stultitia is 
characterized by a preoccupation with the future, the writing of hupomnēmata refocuses one’s 
attention on the past, and in fact makes a “possession of the past that one can enjoy to the full 
and without disturbance.” 30 There is thus a certain measure of discernment and judgment 
involved in determining the “shape” of the true discourse one seeks to subjectivate; it is not a 
matter of bringing together any and all discourse. 
The second point is that this true discourse is a heterogeneous one; the writing of 
hupomnēmata is “a regular and deliberate practice of the disparate.” The material that one 
collects is selected for its “local truth” or “circumstantial use value.” This explains why, for 
example, Seneca finds value in making note of points drawn not only from Stoic discourse, but 
also from those discourses to which Stoicism is nominally opposed, such as Epicureanism; “the 
essential requirement,” Foucault writes, “is that he be able to consider the selected sentence as a 
maxim that is true in what it asserts, suitable in what it prescribes, and useful in terms of one’s 
circumstances.” If the truth with which hupomnēmata is a means of bringing oneself into relation 
is indeed a fragmentary logos, then the original context of any given fragment is less important 
than the new context into which it is placed by being gathered together with other fragments, 
selected based on their usefulness for the individual at the moment of collection. The truth of 
ostensibly universal discourse is thus, paradoxically, not effected by being filtered through one’s 
15 
 
individual circumstances and requirements – indeed, this is one of the principal means by which 
the subjectivation of that discourse is accomplished.31 
The third and final point is that subjectivation is effected through the writing of 
hupomnēmata precisely in its bringing together of a heterogenous truth with the individual who 
gathers it. The hupomnēmata, as the collation of a heterogenous discourse, resists unification in 
and of itself, and must be unified in the individual; this constitutes, and Foucault uses this word 
here explicitly, precisely the subjectivation of discourse. The truth, which the individual works 
through and solidifies by writing it down, in effect becomes the truth of the self – not, again, in 
any internal sense, as something unearthed from within the individual, but precisely as 
something other made same: 
The role of writing is to constitute, along with all that reading has constituted, a “body”… 
And this body should be understood not as a body of doctrine but, rather – following an 
often-evoked metaphor of digestion, as the very body of the one who, by transcribing his 
readings, has appropriated them and made them his own: writing transforms the thing 
seen or heard “into tissue and blood”… It becomes a principle of rational action in the 
writer himself.32  
To be clear, this process is not to be understood as a subsumption into what is other, but 
rather a bringing-together of what is other with the individual to produce, effectively, a new 
individual. On this point Foucault cites one of Seneca’s letters, in which Seneca likens the ideal 
practice of reading, and of writing based on what one reads, to the behaviour of bees: “First they 
fly about and choose the flowers best suited for making honey, then distribute what they have 
collected throughout the hive” (Seneca, Letters, 84.3).33 On one view, he notes, bees do not 
really make honey but merely collect it; on another view, the very act of collection changes the 
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material’s character, bringing it together to form something new (84.4). Reading and writing, 
Seneca argues, should be like this, where the bringing together of the disparate fragments one 
selects changes the character of the material, and produces something new born of the unification 
of that material with the individual who collects it. 
 I will turn now to Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. As noted, the absence of this text from 
the analyses of “Self Writing” is a curious one, and this is especially true in the case of 
hupomnēmata. Following the influential work of Pierre Hadot,34 the text is generally taken as a 
paradigmatic example of that form.35 Moreover, while there are certainly differences in how the 
two conceive of ancient thought, Hadot’s conception of the Meditations as a text which itself 
constitutes work done by its author on himself has strong echoes with Foucault’s account of 
hupomnēmata – though Hadot falls short of explicitly linking this quality of the text to its being 
hupomnēmata, which he seems to understand as more of a formal categorization.36 We can only 
speculate as to Foucault’s reasons for avoiding discussion of Marcus’ Meditations in this context 
(if it is indeed an avoidance). Perhaps this is simply an example of what Chloe Taylor notes as 
Foucault’s tendency to prefer “the obscure over the canonical,” which she sees evidenced in his 
relative lack of engagement with either Augustine or Rousseau on the subject of confession.37 
 In any case, one reason for identifying the Meditations as hupomnēmata is that Marcus 
himself may, in fact, tell us this, and it is with this passage that I will begin: 
No more wandering. You are not likely to read your own jottings [hupomnēmatia], your 
histories of the ancient Greeks and Romans, your extracts from their literature laid up for 
your old age. Hurry then to the end, abandon vain hopes; rescue yourself, if you have any 
care for yourself, while the opportunity it still there (3.14).38 
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Hupomnēmatia is a diminutive form of hupomnēmata, and as such means something like “little 
notes.”39 Whether or not Marcus’ use of the word is, in fact, meant to refer to the Meditations 
itself, the passage suggests, at the very least, that Marcus understands himself as consciously 
engaged, whether in this particular text or not, in a practice of gathering together disparate 
sources and thoughts and writing them down, i.e. a practice very much in line with Foucault’s 
description of hupomnēmata. 
But the passage also suggests a certain suspicion of such practices. Whatever the “little 
notes” are, Marcus appears to admonish himself for relying on them overmuch when he should 
simply “rescue himself,” by which he perhaps means to put into action that of which his notes 
can only be, at best, a rehearsal. This should be kept in mind going forward; while I maintain that 
the Meditations evidences the practices that Foucault describes in “Self Writing,” we must be 
careful not to over-emphasize the role of writing in Marcus’ conception of Stoicism, of 
philosophy in general, or indeed of the practice of self-transformation. As Foucault reminds us 
elsewhere, philosophy of this period is a matter of providing principles to better support the day-
to-day life and conduct of the individual rather than on the elaboration of theory for its own 
sake.40 In the Stoic canon we find repeated warnings about the dangers of emphasizing scholarly 
pursuits over practical action, and Marcus is no different in this respect, as we see in the above 
passage and elsewhere; for example, in 10.1 he tells himself: “No more roundabout discussion of 
what makes a good man. Be one!” 
That said, writing clearly does play a role, as 3.14 makes clear, and it is on this note that 
we turn to the practice of writing in the Meditations. In the case of hupomnēmata, we ought to 
examine those passages which are most clearly the result of a process of collecting together a 
disparate and heterogenous, but nonetheless true, discourse: namely, Marcus’ numerous direct 
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citations of other texts. Now, it is true that, for Foucault at least, hupomnēmata need not be 
composed only of fragments or paraphrases of other texts; personal observations, recollections, 
references to things heard or seen etc., would all seem to fall under the purview of the practice, 
and in this sense the entirety of the text is hupomnēmata. But it is easiest, for my purposes, to 
focus on such passages as are most definitively and obviously repurposed from other sources. 
For the sake of space, and because an exhaustive analysis of every citation is not required for my 
purposes, I will limit myself to a particular sequence of chapters: 11.22-39, all but two of which 
are direct quotations or paraphrases, which Marcus presents without comment or interpretation.41 
Of these fifteen citations, seven are from Epictetus. Five of these are from the Discourses 
(11.23, 11.33-36), while the other two are fragments (11.37-38); 11.23 is a reference to Socrates 
which is itself sourced from Plato’s Crito and/or Phaedo.42 There are three other anecdotes about 
Socrates; one of these is a story told by Aristotle and Seneca, which Marcus slightly 
misremembers here (11.25), while the other two (11.28, 11.39) are from unknown sources. The 
remaining five are from: a fable told by Aesop, Horace, and Babrius (11.22); Epicurus, as quoted 
in one of Seneca’s letters (11.26); a Pythagorean saying of unknown origin (11.27); an otherwise 
unknown poem (11.30); Homer’s Odyssey (11.31); and Hesiod’s Works and Days, with the 
quotation slightly altered from the original (11.32). 
 If, for Foucault, confession is the subjectivation of true discourse, then on a Foucauldian 
reading of the Meditations Marcus’ citations clearly function as that true discourse, brought 
together “near at hand” for his own use. “True” discourse because the authority and correctness 
of these citations is not in question for the one who has compiled them. Nearly half, after all, are 
from one of the canonical Stoic sages, and indeed the one with whom Marcus’ own approach to 
Stoicism is most clearly in line.43 Another three concern Socrates, who is, for Epictetus at least, a 
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kind of precursor and exemplar of the Stoic sage.44 Another two are from traditional and 
unquestionable authorities in the Greco-Roman world (Homer and Hesiod), while another is 
from an established philosophical authority with its own resonances with Stoicism (the 
Pythagorean tradition). The other two literary references (to the fable and to the unknown poem) 
have no direct Stoic authority, but the contents of the quotations themselves have clear 
resonances with Stoic thought. This leaves only the reference to Epicurus, and while it is true 
that the Epicurean school was traditionally taken to be in opposition to Stoicism, the quotation’s 
concern with virtue is perfectly in keeping with Stoic thought, and in any case it is stamped with 
the approval of having first been cited by Seneca. 
 As we are considering a particular sequence of citations, we can examine them more 
closely, and in the order that they appear, in order to get a sense of the truth which is to be 
subjectivated, and also the manner in which the very selection and arrangement of that truth 
works toward that subjectivation. The sequence begins with a reference to the fable of the town 
mouse (here called the “house mouse”) and the country mouse (here called the “hill mouse”), 
with an emphasis on the “frightened scurrying of the house mouse;” this suggests an equation of 
urban life with unease and country life with rustic simplicity. This is immediately followed by 
11.23, in which is referenced Epictetus’ claim that “Socrates used to call the popular beliefs 
‘bogies,’ things to frighten children with.” This both seems to follow up on, and somewhat 
recontextualize, the thought evoked by 11.22: urban life, such as that which must be lived by the 
Emperor of Rome, is productive of fear and anxiety – but, after all, to fall in with the common 
lot’s anxieties is to give in to a fear appropriate only for children. 
After these reflections on proper conduct in the face of fear comes a series of examples of 
exemplary conduct and reflections on the benefits of such reminders: a story of Socrates 
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declining the invitation of a king in order to avoid receiving benefits he would be unable to 
return in kind (11.25); Epicurus’ remark that one should always keep in mind the conduct of 
virtuous figures from the past (11.26); a Pythagorean maxim on looking to the dawn sky as a 
reminder of the order and goodness of the universe (11.27); and a story of Socrates apparently 
unembarrassed at being seen in public in his underclothes (11.28). Not only do these chapters 
share a strong thematic unity, but together they seem to comprise an argument for the value of 
the very act of citing exemplars of which they are themselves examples. 
Next come three quotations from literary sources: the unknown poet’s “You were born a 
slave: you have no voice” (11.30); Odysseus’ expression of joy at his outwitting the Cyclops – 
“And the heart within me laughed” (11.31); and Hesiod’s line “They will pour scorn on virtue 
and sting with their abuse,” where “virtue” has been substituted for the original “them” (11.32). 
Divorced of original context, the meaning behind such quotations is highly oblique – which is 
precisely the point, as in their context in the Meditations they take on new meaning, one meant 
for Marcus alone. Coming on the heel of the passages on exemplars, they suggest a turn toward 
more personal reflection, or perhaps simply a turn from considerations of conduct to emotions: 
meditations on feelings of helplessness (the voiceless slave), pride (Odysseus), and the sensation 
of being insulted or offended. All, for the Stoic, negative emotions; that they follow citations of 
exemplary conduct suggests, perhaps, self-admonishment, or perhaps a brief catalogue of states 
of mind to be avoid. 
After this, it makes sense that Marcus would then turn to a series of quotations from 
Epictetus, which seem to function as straightforward memorizations (or, to use Foucault’s 
language, reactivations) of Stoic principles: a reminder of the vainness of hoping for children 
past the appropriate age (11.33); a reiteration of the very traditional Stoic idea that one ought to 
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constantly remind oneself of the possibility that one’s loved ones will die, in order to constantly 
reaffirm that there is nothing inherently bad in this occurrence (11.34);45 another traditional Stoic 
affirmation, of the order inherent to natural processes (11.35); two successive iterations of the 
foundational Stoic principle that our own judgements, and only our own judgements, are entirely 
within our own control (11.36; 11.37);46 and finally a somewhat oblique reference, presumably a 
statement on the importance of adopting the right mindset – “So this is not a contest for a trivial 
prize: at issue is madness or sanity” (11.38). 
The sequence ends with the recounting of a story of Socrates, the source of which is now 
lost: 
Socrates used to question thus: “What do you want to have? The souls of rational or 
irrational beings?” “Rational.” “What sort of rational beings? The pure or the lower?” 
“The pure.” “Why then don’t you aim for that?” “Because we have it.” “Why then your 
fighting and disagreements” (11.39)? 
Despite the absence of a source, this is undoubtedly a familiar scene to any reader of Plato’s 
dialogues: a perfect example of Socratic elenchus. But it is also a fitting capstone to this series of 
citations, suggestive as it is of the idea that human beings are innately rational and thereby 
capable, entirely of their own volition, of achieving happiness and tranquility.  
The entire sequence seems to share a movement or logic of sorts: from agitation, to 
seeing solace from that agitation in recounting the exemplary conduct of others, to reflections on 
negative emotions, to the reaffirmation of key principles. If the meaning of some citations is 
clearer than others, this is precisely because they have been selected based on their usefulness to 
their compiler; they constitute a true discourse, but one that serves Marcus’ particular needs. Yet 
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at the same time, there is nothing idiosyncratic about what has been selected; nothing is out of 
place in terms of what any Roman Stoic of this period would understand as true.  
To connect this back to Foucault’s three points regarding hupomnēmata’s role in 
subjectivation, we can say of these citations that: (1) they reflect Marcus’ extensive reading, 
from which he has selected and ordered those fragments he evidently finds most valuable; (2) 
they reflect a disparate, heterogenous discourse, each of which has been selected for its 
individual, “local” truth, enhanced and made useful by virtue of being brought into relation with 
other citations; (3) though disparate, they constitute together a kind of unity with each other and 
in relation to Marcus’ particular circumstances (such as being a Stoic or being Emperor of 
Rome), and this in particular is what I have tried to show by considering what I called the 
“movement” of this group of chapters. 
Before moving on to Foucault’s account of correspondence, and from there to reading the 
Meditations in terms of correspondence, I want to reiterate that in “Self Writing,” Foucault 
clearly understands hupomnēmata as a distinct practice, able to achieve the subjectivation of 
discourse in its own right; the same will hold true for correspondence. However, as mentioned, 
Foucault does allow that correspondence can use hupomnēmata as its basis, and whether or not it 
does the two practices are clearly closely related; one achieves subjectivation of true discourse 
through the selection, collation, and citation of true discourse, while the other achieves it through 
an enunciation made in relation to that discourse. As such, I believe it is in keeping with 
Foucault to read the accounts of these two practices together, as ideally working in tandem to 
effect the subjectivation of true discourse as, properly speaking, a confession. And this is 
precisely what we see, I argue, in the Meditations. 
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 III. Correspondence and the Meditations  
 In this section, I will proceed identically to the preceding section: first, I will explicate 
Foucault’s account of correspondence in “Self Writing,” and then I will read select chapters of 
the Meditations as representative examples of this practice.  
In terms of confession, we can say that hupomnēmata is the process of constituting the 
true discourse to which one seeks to relate oneself. The bringing together of that discourse is, of 
course, itself a way of relating oneself to it, in ways we have already seen. Correspondence, on 
the other hand, is best understood as the enunciation through which confession takes place, i.e. 
the “telling the truth about oneself,” to refer back to the general definition of the Dartmouth 
lectures. In this sense, it can be understood as, at least potentially, one of the exercises for which 
hupomnēmata constitutes the raw material.  
 In this context, “correspondence” refers, of course, to the writing of letters, and the letter 
is, Foucault tells us, “by definition a text meant for others.”47 I will problematize this claim 
shortly, but for now let us take it at face value. Initially, Foucault appears to have in mind only a 
particular kind of letter: the philosophical missive, typified by the letters of Epicurus and Seneca, 
which provide recapitulations of philosophical principles and/or practical advice and opinions 
offered with those principles in mind. In such a text, the goal is, of course, the intellectual and 
moral betterment of the recipient, or in other words to effect a certain transformation of self in 
the reader. But the letter is also, like the hupomnēmata, a means of effecting this transformation 
in the writer: 
The letter one sends in order to help one’s correspondent – advise him, exhort him, 
admonish him, console him – constitutes for the writer a kind of training: something like 
24 
 
soldiers in peacetime practicing the manual of arms, the opinions that one gives to others 
in a pressing situation are a way of preparing oneself for a similar eventuality.48  
 Yet, unlike hupomnēmata, it does not seem that the desired effect can be accomplished in 
isolation. Hupomnēmata constitutes a discourse for oneself. Correspondence is a discourse for 
oneself, as well as for another, a reader; indeed, the goal of correspondence is precisely to 
establish a relation between self and other, through the writer’s manifesting themselves for the 
reader: 
The letter makes the writer “present” to the one to whom he addresses it. And present not 
simply through the information he gives concerning his life, his activities, his successes 
and failures, his good luck or misfortunes; rather, present with a kind of immediate, 
almost physical presence.49 
This presence is manifested through a recounting of the writer’s daily life for their 
correspondent, in all its banal detail. In turn, the correspondent responds with advice and with 
recounting their own day; between correspondents there is, therefore, a continuous reciprocal 
relation, the aim of which is not simply to seek and/or provide guidance, but to establish a 
relationship of confession, in which the writer becomes the subject of the true discourse in light 
of which they relate to their reader. “The reciprocity that correspondence establishes,” writes 
Foucault, “is not simply that of counsel and aid; it is the reciprocity of the gaze and the 
examination.”50 
 It should be clear at this point that not every letter constitutes correspondence in this 
sense. Foucault underlines the difference between the kind of letter described above and other 
kinds of “personal” missives, such as those of Cicero. The latter involve “accounting for oneself 
as a subject of action (or of deliberation for action) in connection with friends and enemies, 
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fortunate and unfortunate events.” By contrast, in the kind of letter with which Foucault is 
concerned, such as those of Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Pliny, “the narrative of self is the 
account of one’s relation to oneself.”51 
 This clearly recalls Foucault’s earlier discussion of confessional practice, and in 
particular his readings of Seneca in the Dartmouth and Louvain lectures. Here too, the confession 
is a narrative of self-relation, whether delivered to oneself as in the self-examination of On 
Anger, or to another as in Serenus’ confession in On Tranquility of Mind. The confession is an 
account, in a very straightforward sense, of oneself: “an account of the everyday banality, an 
account of correct or incorrect actions, of the regimen observed, of the physical or mental 
exercises in which one engaged.”52 
It is true that, in Foucault’s discussion of correspondence in “Self-Writing,” he 
emphasizes the role of the other in a way that he does not in the earlier lectures. In this sense it 
more closely recalls the History of Sexuality. However, as I argued in that context, Foucault 
seems to open himself up to the possibility of the self as other, and I want to insist on that 
possibility for Foucault’s account of correspondence as well. And it is on this basis that I believe 
the Meditations can be read as a correspondence between Marcus, the writer, and Marcus, the 
reader – understood as the “virtually present” other whom Foucault already allows for in The 
History of Sexuality.53 
 As I did with hupomnēmata, I will now turn to certain chapters in the Meditations that 
best evidence the practice of correspondence. In this case, those chapters are the numerous 
instances in which Marcus, the writer, appears to directly address Marcus, the reader. 
By this I do not mean simply mean Marcus’ consistent use of the second pronoun “you” in a text 
meant solely for himself (though this, in itself, is worth noting). What I have in mind are chapters 
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in which Marcus appears to address himself in regard to some specific circumstance, problem, or 
event, if only obliquely. These, I will argue, are moments of correspondence in the sense 
Foucault outlines: that is, a narrative confession through which the true discourse that Marcus 
has collected is subjectivated, i.e. becomes the truth of Marcus. 
 On my reading there are thirteen such chapters; I will summarize each, briefly, in turn. 
In 2.6, which opens by addressing “my soul,” Marcus castigates himself for an unnamed “self-
harm,” and for letting “[his] own welfare depend on other people’s souls.” 3.14, which we have 
already seen, features Marcus admonishing himself for “wandering,” and for spending time on 
writing when he should, instead, be striving to “rescue” himself.  In 4.30, Marcus compares 
himself to philosophers without material possessions, indeed without books, who are nonetheless 
“faithful to reason.” In the comparison, he judges himself as coming up short: “But I for my part 
have all the food of learning, am yet I am not faithful.” 4.37 contains the observation that “your 
death will soon be on you,” and goes on to measure the various ways in which he has yet failed 
to achieve  tranquility or virtue in his lifetime. In 5.5., he remarks that “They,” whoever they are, 
“cannot admire you for your intellect,” but goes on to list other benefits which could aid him in 
achieving virtue, though of course he chastises himself for failing to make use of them. In 7.17, 
he addresses “my imagination,” apparently in regard to some trouble it has caused him: “Go 
away, in the gods’ name, the way you came: I have no need of you. You have come in your old 
habit.” In 8.1., he notes that there is no longer any chance of living his life as a philosopher, in 
particular given his present station in life  (presumably, that of being Emperor of Rome). In 8.9., 
he warns himself not let anyone hear him “blaming palace life,” and indeed not to let himself 
hear him doing so. In 8.22., he remarks simply: “You deserve what you’re going through.” 9.13 
showcases a rare moment of self-praise; Marcus lauds himself for recognizing that the 
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“bothering circumstances” in which he had found himself were the result of nothing but his own 
judgements. In 9.26, he resolves to cease enduring the “innumerable troubles” which result from 
“not leaving your directing mind to do the work it was made for.” In 10.16, as noted earlier, he 
commands himself to be a good man rather than just discuss what makes a good man in the 
abstract. And, finally, in 11.17 he reminds himself that the “walk of life” in which he now finds 
himself is more conducive to philosophy than any other. Given earlier remarks in which his 
present circumstances appear to be barriers to philosophy, this chapter suggests an attempt to 
will himself into the right frame of mind, or it may reflect a genuine change of heart. 
 Can such remarks really be taken as self-narration? While Marcus is undeniably vague, 
my brief gloss of these passages should suggest that many appear to refer to specific 
circumstances in Marcus’ life, and may well have been intended as reminders or attempts to 
commit to memory specific acts or situations. We can consider these passages in light of 
Foucault’s reading of one of Marcus’ letters to Fronto, which Foucault here explicitly 
characterizes as the written form of the self-examination that Seneca describes in On Anger. 
Marcus enumerates the banal details of his day, in sequence: he woke up late, owing to a cold; he 
spent several hours reading and writing, judging the quality of the latter to be better than that of 
yesterday; he attempted to relieve his throat by gargling honey and water, and so on.54 More 
detailed, certainly, than the cryptic remarks of the Meditations, but hardly more “personal,” and 
in both cases the goal is the same: to manifest, for the gaze of another, one’s acts, the better to 
examine them in light of the truth one has accepted. 
 And that truth is always at issue, even if only implicitly. In the background of all of 
Marcus’ self-admonishments are principles or ideals of conduct that he understands himself as 
having failed to follow or live up to; the idea, presumably, is to remind himself of such failures, 
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the better to avoid them in the future. In some cases it is not clear precisely which principles 
Marcus has in mind, but it nonetheless is clear that a failure of principles is at play. In 4.30, for 
example, it is not clear in what sense Marcus understands himself as “unfaithful to Reason,” but 
in noting that he is such despite all of his learning, he clearly implicates a failure to adhere to a 
truth that he already knows and has accepted. In other cases, the specific truth in question is 
clear, as in 2.6’s acknowledgement of failure to abide by a traditional Stoic maxim that we have 
already: that one’s welfare does not depend on “other people’s souls,” but only on oneself. 
  The appearance of this maxim is one concrete illustration of the link between 
hupomnēmata and correspondence in terms of the subjectivation of true discourse. Through the 
former practice, Marcus renders the principle near at hand through the citation of true discourse, 
in this case traditional Stoic discourse as taught by one of its principle authorities, Epictetus. And 
through correspondence, he reactivates and reminds himself of the very principle which he has 
rendered close at hand by recounting, as writer-Marcus, the manner in which he failed to adhere 
to it. As in Serenus’ confession to Seneca, he makes (or remakes) himself a subject of that 
principle precisely through enunciating himself as a subject of actions in relation to the discourse 
he has accepted as true. 
Conclusion 
 To recap: in this paper I have undertaken an explication of Foucault’s conception of the 
role of writing in the arts of the self, and particularly its confessional role, where confession is 
understood as the subjectivation of true discourse. Specifically, I have looked at Foucault’s 
descriptions of two practices, hupomnēmata and correspondence, alongside the illustrative 
example of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. The broad goal of all of this was to accomplish the 
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preliminary steps of a Foucauldian genealogy of writing, and at this point it should be clear that 
Foucault identifies writing as closely linked to subjectivity by way of practice. 
 In terms of the Meditations, I have shown that it evidences both aspects of the 
subjectivation of discourse – the gathering together of true discourse through hupomnēmata, and 
the enunciation of correspondence, in this case understood as the correspondence of Marcus with 
himself. The illustrative value of the Meditations in terms of a Foucauldian genealogy of writing 
practices is thus quite clear: it offers, side by side, examples of both of the  practices which 
Foucault describes. 
 As well, it should now be more clear what Foucault might have to offer in terms of an 
alternative to the Derridean conception of the role of writing in philosophy. At the very least, the 
analysis of the Meditations in Foucauldian terms can suggest what it might mean to conceive of 
writing as an art or practice of the self, and of the philosophical text as a tangible manifestation 
of such practice. 
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does not seem in keeping with what Foucault repeatedly stresses about the arts of the self: that 
they are undertaken for oneself. Indeed, Foucault stresses, in the Dartmouth lectures, that on the 
Greek conception one enters into the confessional relationship with another provisionally, for the 
sake of one’s own self-transformation; the presence of another may be provisionally called for, 
but it is not for this other that the exercise is performed. See Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Self, 
28-29. 
53 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 61. To be clear, there is no question of the Meditation’s 
comprising correspondence in the straightforward sense of a text sent to a literal other. The first 
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evidence of its publication does not emerge until centuries after Marcus’ death, and it is unlikely 
that he ever intended it to be seen by anyone but himself. See: Hadot, Inner Citadel, 21-23. 
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